Dealing with conflict
The sages say that when the Jewish people saw the Egyptians chasing after them, they divided into four groups regarding what to do.
One group said they should give-up and return to Egypt;
a second group wanted to fight the Egyptians;
the third wanted to flee into the dessert and hide
(according to the Jerusalem Talmud they wanted cry out to God in the desert);
the fourth weighed the options and decided to keep moving forward, into the water.
Four groups, four approaches.
There is a general lesson to be learnt here.
The Egyptians rushing up from behind are symbolic of any struggle that threatens to stop us from advancing and reaching our goals.
The four different responses to the impending struggle stem from four different ways of seeing the world, each of which represents a consciousness linked with one of the four Worlds of Kabbalah.
Immediate surrender to the demands of the enemy is the motto of the first group who wanted to return to Egypt.
This is the point of view of those whose sole ambition is to live comfortably and without worries. When faced with a challenging struggle, individuals who see this as the goal of life will quickly give up their beliefs and goals. This attitude is expressed today by those who seek to surrender in hopes that they, in return, will act in goodwill and surrender their own goals and objectives. It is also the ill that has befallen many who in light of the difficulties experienced have simply picked up and left for somewhere “better.”
Even the call to arms for fighting the enemy made by the second group contains a hidden aspect of surrender.
By halting your own advance and turning to face your enemy, even if you have not surrendered completely, you have given your adversary a partial victory in that he has stopped you from moving forward.
The third approach, fleeing towards the desert,does not face the enemy, but rather claims, as the verse in Isaiah states, “Hide for a moment, until the danger passes.”
The argument, which we know so well is to hide in isolation in the shadow of the “clouds of glory.”
There in a closed world, they hope that things will work themselves out. Even this way of dealing with conflict and struggle expresses an element of surrender, both in the helplessness it fosters and in its aversion from coping with struggle.
The fourth way of thinking, and it is important to stress that this was the only option that accorded with the Almighty’s, claims that the only proper response to an enemy the likes of Egypt who attacks from behind (as opposed to Amalek who at the end of our parshah attacks head on and forces us to fight him) is to to push forward, even if this means walking straight into the sea. The only real solution is to ignore the enemies from behind, advance, and continue marching on towards our goal, with determination and willingness for selfsacrifice.
Four approaches, four worlds.
When corresponding these four modes of consciousness with the Kabbalistic Worlds, note that each reflects the sefirah of crown, the source of the general attitude guiding the consciousness in that World.
The first group waving the flag of surrender corresponds to the World of Action, the lowest level of consciousness, where evil has the upper hand.
When a consciousness resides mostly in this world and it remains detached from the
consciousness and points of view of the higher Worlds (which one connects to through the Torah and the tzadikim) when faced with conflict, he cannot help but feel that there is no hope and that evil will overpower him and be triumphant.
A person in this state of mind despairs because he feels isolated and alone, even if he is in a group of like-minded individuals.
THE REDEMPTION GROWS NEAR
The ultimate goal of the true king of Israel is to become one with his people, a state alluded to by the sages’ statement that “the servant of a king is a king [himself].” Even if all his subjects enjoy the best possible life, the king will not be satisfied until he and his essence—his single-mindedness in serving God and God alone—is incorporated into each of his subjects.
The king is willing to completely give up his own self and his privacy in order that each of his subjects can be transformed into him—this is the true king. The king yearns that everyone should become Mashiach,to the point where he himself is no longer seen, is no longer in the picture. It is as if the king can disappear
from the picture altogether.
The approach to struggle taken by the second group that turns back to face the enemy
corresponds to the consciousness of the World of Formation, which (at least externally) divides reality into half good and half evil.
The World of Formation is where the struggle between the good and evil inclinations in each individual’s life takes place.
Those who turn to battle evil do so because they have not heard or taken to heart the Ba’al Shem Tov’s teaching that one should “refrain from evil,” through the power of “doing good.”
In order to win our fight against evil (be it the evil that still lurks in our heart, or an external enemy),Chassidut teaches that we should ignore it and focus only on augmenting our good actions.
As we have explained, by turning to engage the enemy (and forgetting about the good task at hand) this group’s consciousness provides the enemy with an important psychological victory.
The individuals in the third group, who prefer the path of isolating themselves in the desert until everything blows over corresponds with the consciousness found in the World of Creation.
The World of Creation is the source of repentance (teshuvah) and the cry to God, which stems from the sense of distance from the World of Emanation, the consciousness that is one with the Divine. This causes the individuals with this type of consciousness to cry out and pray to God
(thereby distancing themselves from their true destination, Mount Sinai,
symbolic of the Divine consciousness of the World of Emanation).
Indeed,unlike the emotional storm that accompanies the consciousness of Formation (the second group) this approach is based on reason. The feelings stemming from a consciousness of the World of Creation are grounded and indeed there are times
when one should simply turn to God and cry out for salvation, “from one’s self and the hearts depths.” Still, as much as the emotions are already clarified, the intellectual mindset of this group’s consciousness is yet to be and what is lacking is the ability to keep one’s focus on the ultimate goal—in this case, reaching Mt. Sinai and receiving the total clarity of the Torah.
The fourth group’s consciousness corresponds to the awareness of the World of Emanation, the highest world, where God’s will shines brilliantly and clearly.
In Kabbalah this is described as, “the father principle (i.e., supernal wisdom, the source of Torah) nests in emanation.”
The real goal is to connect the souls of Israel to the Torah its truth and the life it gives. Thus, the goal is to reach Mt.Sinai and if a body of water blocks the way, one must be prepared to jump in, without any hesitation, knowing full well that nothing can deter us from reaching this goal.
Obviously, there is a powerful message here for us. We too face difficult challenges today and it is all to easy to choose to choose the easy way out.
Sometimes, even choosing to fight is the wrong choice, because the only purpose evil has is to confuse us and divert our focus from our real task.
The only true and tested response is to continue moving forward and advancing towards our goals with total self sacrifice.
...
Notes: 1. Isaiah 26:20 2. Psalms 34:15. 3. Psalms 64:7.
Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Values. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων
Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Values. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων
The Eleven Virtues
Valor
Right action in the face of any challenge.
Nobility
Poise and elegance in both word and deed.
Discernment
Piercing all glamour to see the Truth in one's self and in others.
Pride
Having a true sense of one's worth.
Compassion
The vice of Kings!
Fidelity
Loyalty to one's self, one's comrades and to one's word.
Passion
To do all with love under will.
Strength
The body is the Temple of God.
Discipline
Perseverance, that the Work may be accomplished.
Self Reliance
Only a free man may walk our path.
Hospitality
To share what one has with others, especially those far from home.
Right action in the face of any challenge.
Nobility
Poise and elegance in both word and deed.
Discernment
Piercing all glamour to see the Truth in one's self and in others.
Pride
Having a true sense of one's worth.
Compassion
The vice of Kings!
Fidelity
Loyalty to one's self, one's comrades and to one's word.
Passion
To do all with love under will.
Strength
The body is the Temple of God.
Discipline
Perseverance, that the Work may be accomplished.
Self Reliance
Only a free man may walk our path.
Hospitality
To share what one has with others, especially those far from home.
FORTITUDE
(1) Manliness is etymologically what is meant by the Latin word virtus and by the Greek andreia, with which we may compare arete (virtue), aristos (best), and aner (man). Mas (male) stands to Mars, the god of war, as arsen (male) to the corresponding Greek deity Ares. While andreia (manliness) has been specialized to signify valour, virtus has been left in its wider generality, and only in certain contexts is it limited, as by Caesar when he says: "Helvetii reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt". Here the writer was certainly not taking the pious outlook upon virtue, except in so far as for primitive peoples the leading virtue is bravery and the skillful strength to defend their lives and those of their fellow-tribesmen. At this stage of culture we may apply Spinoza's notion that virtue is the conservatory force of life. "In proportion as a man aims at and is successful in pursuing his utile, that is his esse, so much the more is he endowed with virtue; on the other hand, in proportion as he neglects to cultivate his utile or his esse, so much the greater is his impotence" (Eth., IV, prop. 20). "Virtue is that human faculty, which is defined only by the essence of man, that is, which is limited only by the efforts of man to persevere in his esse" (prop. 22). The idea is continued in Propositiones 23, 24, 25, 27. The will to live — der Wille zu leben — is the root virtue. Of course Spinoza carries his doctrine higher than does the savage warrior, for he adds that the power preservative and promotive of life is adequacy of ideas, reasonable conduct, conformity to intelligent nature: finally that "the highest virtue of the intellect is the knowledge of God" (lib. V, prop. xlii). Spinoza usually mixes the noble with the ignoble in his views: for a rude people his philosophy stops short at virtue, the character of the strong man defending his existence against many assaults.
Aristotle does not say that fortitude is the highest virtue; but he selects it first for treatment when he describes the moral virtues: eipomen proton peri andreias (Eth. Nic., III, 6); whereas St. Thomas is at pains to say explicitly that fortitude ranks third after prudence and justice among the cardinal virtues. The braves in a warrior tribe and the glamour of braverie in knight-errantry, the display of pomp by modern armies on parade, were not objects to disturb the sense of proportion in the mind of the Friar Preacher. Still less could etymology deceive his judgment into thinking that the prime virtue was the soldier's valour commended on the Victoria Cross. Neither would he despise the tribute "For Valour" in its own degree.
(2) To come now to definitions. If we consult Plato and Aristotle we find the former comparing man to the god Glaucus who from dwelling in the sea had his divine limbs encrusted beyond recognition with weeds and shells: and that represents the human spirit disguised by the alien body which it drags about as a penalty. The soul in its own rational nature (for our present purpose we fuse together the two terms psyche and nous, distinguished by Aristotle, into one — the soul) is simple: man is compound, and, being conflictingly compounded, he has to drive a pair of steeds in his body, one ignoble — the concupiscences — the other relatively noble — the spiritual element, in which is "go", "dash", "onslaught", "pluck", "endurance". Upon the latter element is based fortitude, but the animal spirit needs to be taken up and guided by the rational soul in order to become the virtue. It is in the breast that ho thymos, to thymoeides (courage, passion) dwells, midway between reason in the head and concupiscence in the abdomen. Plato's high spirituality kept him from speaking too exaltedly of fortitude which rested on bodily excellence: consequently he would have wise legislators educate their citizens rather in temperance than in courage, which is separable from wisdom and may be found in children or in mere animals (Laws, I, 630, C, D, E; 631, C; 667, A).
Although Aristotle makes animal courage only the basis of fortitude — the will is courageous, but the animal spirit co-operates (ho de thymos synergei) — he has not a similar contempt for the body, and speaks more honourably of courage when it has for its prime object the conquest of bodily fear before the face of death in battle. Aristotle likes to narrow the scope of his virtues as Plato likes to enlarge his scope. He will not with his predecessor (Lackes, 191, D, E) extend fortitude to cover all the firmness or stability which is needful for every virtue, consequently Kant was able to say: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obeying the dictates of duty" (Anthropol., sect. 10, a). The Platonic Socrates took another limited view when he said that courage was the episteme ton deinon kai me (Laches, 199); hence he inferred that it could be taught. Given that in themselves a man prefers virtue to vice, then we may say that for him every act of vice is a failure of fortitude. Aristotle would have admitted this too; nevertheless he chose his definition: "Fortitude is the virtue of the man who, being confronted with a noble occasion of encountering the danger of death, meets it fearlessly" (Eth. Nic., III, 6). Such a spirit has to be formed as a habit upon data more or less favourable; and therein it resembles other virtues of the moral kind. Aristotle would have controverted Kant's description of moral stability in all virtue as not being a quality cultivatable into a habit: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obeying the dictates of duty, never developing into a custom but always springing freshly and directly from the mind" (Anthropol., I, 10, a). Not every sort of danger to life satisfies Aristotle's condition for true fortitude: there must be present some noble display of prowess — alke kai kalon. He may not quite positively exclude the passive endurance of martyrdom, but St. Thomas seems to be silently protesting against such an exclusion when he maintains that courage is rather in endurance than in onset.
As a commentator on Aristotle, Professor J.A. Stewart challenges the friends of the martyrs to make a stand for their cause when he says: "It is only when a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can show courage" (p. 283). Here the disjunctive "or" may save the situation: but there is no such reserve on p. 286, where he adds: "Men show courage when they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (e) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realized without the latter, in which case the andreia would be of a spurious kind: the latter condition, however, cannot be realized without the former. Death in a good cause which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist could not be kalos thanatos (glorious death)." Does Aristotle positively make this exclusion? If so, St. Thomas corrects him very needfully, as Britons would admit on behalf of their soldiers who, off the coast of S. Africa in 1852, nobly stood in their ranks and went unresistingly down in the sinking ship, Birkenhead, that they might give the civilians a better chance of being saved. As specimens of courage not in the higher order Aristotle gives the cases of soldiers whose skill enables them to meet without much apprehension what others would dread, and who are ready to flee as soon as grave danger is seen: of animally courageous men whose action is hardly moral: of courage where hope is largely in excess over dread: of ignorance which does not apprehend the risk: and of civic virtue which is moved by the sanction of reward and penalty. In the above instances the test of oi andreioi dia to kalon prattousi — "the exercise of fortitude is virtue", a principle which is opposed to the mere pragmatism that would measure courage by efficiency in soldiership — fails. Aristotle says that mercenaries, who have not a high appreciation of the value of their own lives, may very well expose their lives with more readiness than could be found in the virtuous man who understands the worth of his own life, and who regards death as the peras — the end of his own individual existence (phoberotaton d' ho thanatos peras gar). Some have admired Russian nihilists going to certain death with no hope for themselves, here or hereafter, but with a hope for future generations of Russians. It is in the hope for the end that Aristotle places the stimulus for the brave act which of itself brings pain. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori ("It is sweet and noble to die for one's native land" — Horace, Odes, III, ii, 13): the nobility is in the act, the sweetness chiefly in the anticipated consequences, excepting so far as there is a strongly felt nobility (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 5-9) in the self-sacrifice.
(3) St. Thomas keeps as close to Aristotle as he may, departing from him as to the dignity, perhaps, which is to be found in the passive martyr's death, as to the hope of future life, and as to the character of virtue as a matter mainly of fine conduct aesthetically. He calls the specific virtue of fortitude that which braves the greatest dangers and therefore that which meets the risk of life in battle. Fortitude is concerned not so much with audacia as with timor: not so much with aggredi (attack) as with sustinere (endurance): which means that the courageous man has to attend rather to bearing up against terrifying circumstances than to mastering his impetuosity or else to arousing it to the requisite degree: principalior actus fortitudinis est sustinere, immobiliter sistere in periculis, quam aggredi. Seneca as a Stoic also attacks Aristotle's use of anger as an instrument in the hand of virtue; he treats the passion as bad and to suppressed. In the onslaught is displayed the animal excitement, the battle rage, which St. Thomas calls the irascible passion: and of this St. Thomas says, what Aristotle says of thymos, that it is an agency to be used by the rational will within due limits. Anything like a malignant desire to slaughter a hated enemy out of vengeance or out of savage delight in blood-shedding should be excluded. For the endurance (sustinere), says St. Thomas, the irascible part is not demanded, since the reasonable will suffice, "as the act of endurance rests only with the reason per se". As a cardinal virtue, which is a consideration not taken up by Aristotle, fortitude is treated by St. Thomas from the aspect of its need for ensuring the stability of the virtues in general: Cardinales principales dicuntur virtutes, quoe proecipue sibi vindicant id quod pertinet communiter ad virtutes. Virtues in general must act with that firmness which fortitude bestows (II-II, Q, cxxiii).
(4) Fortitude as one of the gifts from the Holy Ghost is a supernatural virtue, and passes beyond the Aristotelian range. It is what, as Christians, we must always have in mind in order to make our actions acceptable for eternal life. But we still keep hold upon the natural principles of fortitude as those whereon grace has to build. In the spiritual life of the ordinary Christian much that Aristotle has said remains in its own degree true, though we have to depart especially from the master's insistence upon the field of battle. Our exercise is mainly not in war strictly so-called, but in moral courage against the evil spirit of the times, against improper fashions, against human respect, against the common tendency to seek at least the comfortable, if not the voluptuous. We need courage also to be patient under poverty or privation, and to make laudable struggles to rise in the social scale. I requires fortitude to mount above the dead level of average Christianity into the region of magnanimity, and if opportunity allow it, of magnificence, which are the allied virtues of fortitude, while another is perseverance, which tolerates no occasional remissness, still less occasional bouts of dissipation to relieve the strain of high-toned morality and religion.
(5) The physical conditions of fortitude are treated for instance by Bain in "The Emotions and the Will", and they are such as these: "goodness of nervous tone which keeps all the currents in their proper courses with a certain robust persistence; health and freshness; tonic coolness; light and buoyant spirit; elate and sanguine temperament; acquired mastery over terror, as when the soldier gets over the cannon fever of his first engagement, and the public speaker over the nervousness of his first speech" (Chap V, no. 17). These physical matters, though not directly moral, are worthy of attention; there is much interaction between moral and physical qualities, and our duty is to cultivate the two departments of Fortitude conjointly.
Aristotle does not say that fortitude is the highest virtue; but he selects it first for treatment when he describes the moral virtues: eipomen proton peri andreias (Eth. Nic., III, 6); whereas St. Thomas is at pains to say explicitly that fortitude ranks third after prudence and justice among the cardinal virtues. The braves in a warrior tribe and the glamour of braverie in knight-errantry, the display of pomp by modern armies on parade, were not objects to disturb the sense of proportion in the mind of the Friar Preacher. Still less could etymology deceive his judgment into thinking that the prime virtue was the soldier's valour commended on the Victoria Cross. Neither would he despise the tribute "For Valour" in its own degree.
(2) To come now to definitions. If we consult Plato and Aristotle we find the former comparing man to the god Glaucus who from dwelling in the sea had his divine limbs encrusted beyond recognition with weeds and shells: and that represents the human spirit disguised by the alien body which it drags about as a penalty. The soul in its own rational nature (for our present purpose we fuse together the two terms psyche and nous, distinguished by Aristotle, into one — the soul) is simple: man is compound, and, being conflictingly compounded, he has to drive a pair of steeds in his body, one ignoble — the concupiscences — the other relatively noble — the spiritual element, in which is "go", "dash", "onslaught", "pluck", "endurance". Upon the latter element is based fortitude, but the animal spirit needs to be taken up and guided by the rational soul in order to become the virtue. It is in the breast that ho thymos, to thymoeides (courage, passion) dwells, midway between reason in the head and concupiscence in the abdomen. Plato's high spirituality kept him from speaking too exaltedly of fortitude which rested on bodily excellence: consequently he would have wise legislators educate their citizens rather in temperance than in courage, which is separable from wisdom and may be found in children or in mere animals (Laws, I, 630, C, D, E; 631, C; 667, A).
Although Aristotle makes animal courage only the basis of fortitude — the will is courageous, but the animal spirit co-operates (ho de thymos synergei) — he has not a similar contempt for the body, and speaks more honourably of courage when it has for its prime object the conquest of bodily fear before the face of death in battle. Aristotle likes to narrow the scope of his virtues as Plato likes to enlarge his scope. He will not with his predecessor (Lackes, 191, D, E) extend fortitude to cover all the firmness or stability which is needful for every virtue, consequently Kant was able to say: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obeying the dictates of duty" (Anthropol., sect. 10, a). The Platonic Socrates took another limited view when he said that courage was the episteme ton deinon kai me (Laches, 199); hence he inferred that it could be taught. Given that in themselves a man prefers virtue to vice, then we may say that for him every act of vice is a failure of fortitude. Aristotle would have admitted this too; nevertheless he chose his definition: "Fortitude is the virtue of the man who, being confronted with a noble occasion of encountering the danger of death, meets it fearlessly" (Eth. Nic., III, 6). Such a spirit has to be formed as a habit upon data more or less favourable; and therein it resembles other virtues of the moral kind. Aristotle would have controverted Kant's description of moral stability in all virtue as not being a quality cultivatable into a habit: "Virtue is the moral strength of the will in obeying the dictates of duty, never developing into a custom but always springing freshly and directly from the mind" (Anthropol., I, 10, a). Not every sort of danger to life satisfies Aristotle's condition for true fortitude: there must be present some noble display of prowess — alke kai kalon. He may not quite positively exclude the passive endurance of martyrdom, but St. Thomas seems to be silently protesting against such an exclusion when he maintains that courage is rather in endurance than in onset.
As a commentator on Aristotle, Professor J.A. Stewart challenges the friends of the martyrs to make a stand for their cause when he says: "It is only when a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can show courage" (p. 283). Here the disjunctive "or" may save the situation: but there is no such reserve on p. 286, where he adds: "Men show courage when they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (e) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realized without the latter, in which case the andreia would be of a spurious kind: the latter condition, however, cannot be realized without the former. Death in a good cause which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist could not be kalos thanatos (glorious death)." Does Aristotle positively make this exclusion? If so, St. Thomas corrects him very needfully, as Britons would admit on behalf of their soldiers who, off the coast of S. Africa in 1852, nobly stood in their ranks and went unresistingly down in the sinking ship, Birkenhead, that they might give the civilians a better chance of being saved. As specimens of courage not in the higher order Aristotle gives the cases of soldiers whose skill enables them to meet without much apprehension what others would dread, and who are ready to flee as soon as grave danger is seen: of animally courageous men whose action is hardly moral: of courage where hope is largely in excess over dread: of ignorance which does not apprehend the risk: and of civic virtue which is moved by the sanction of reward and penalty. In the above instances the test of oi andreioi dia to kalon prattousi — "the exercise of fortitude is virtue", a principle which is opposed to the mere pragmatism that would measure courage by efficiency in soldiership — fails. Aristotle says that mercenaries, who have not a high appreciation of the value of their own lives, may very well expose their lives with more readiness than could be found in the virtuous man who understands the worth of his own life, and who regards death as the peras — the end of his own individual existence (phoberotaton d' ho thanatos peras gar). Some have admired Russian nihilists going to certain death with no hope for themselves, here or hereafter, but with a hope for future generations of Russians. It is in the hope for the end that Aristotle places the stimulus for the brave act which of itself brings pain. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori ("It is sweet and noble to die for one's native land" — Horace, Odes, III, ii, 13): the nobility is in the act, the sweetness chiefly in the anticipated consequences, excepting so far as there is a strongly felt nobility (Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 5-9) in the self-sacrifice.
(3) St. Thomas keeps as close to Aristotle as he may, departing from him as to the dignity, perhaps, which is to be found in the passive martyr's death, as to the hope of future life, and as to the character of virtue as a matter mainly of fine conduct aesthetically. He calls the specific virtue of fortitude that which braves the greatest dangers and therefore that which meets the risk of life in battle. Fortitude is concerned not so much with audacia as with timor: not so much with aggredi (attack) as with sustinere (endurance): which means that the courageous man has to attend rather to bearing up against terrifying circumstances than to mastering his impetuosity or else to arousing it to the requisite degree: principalior actus fortitudinis est sustinere, immobiliter sistere in periculis, quam aggredi. Seneca as a Stoic also attacks Aristotle's use of anger as an instrument in the hand of virtue; he treats the passion as bad and to suppressed. In the onslaught is displayed the animal excitement, the battle rage, which St. Thomas calls the irascible passion: and of this St. Thomas says, what Aristotle says of thymos, that it is an agency to be used by the rational will within due limits. Anything like a malignant desire to slaughter a hated enemy out of vengeance or out of savage delight in blood-shedding should be excluded. For the endurance (sustinere), says St. Thomas, the irascible part is not demanded, since the reasonable will suffice, "as the act of endurance rests only with the reason per se". As a cardinal virtue, which is a consideration not taken up by Aristotle, fortitude is treated by St. Thomas from the aspect of its need for ensuring the stability of the virtues in general: Cardinales principales dicuntur virtutes, quoe proecipue sibi vindicant id quod pertinet communiter ad virtutes. Virtues in general must act with that firmness which fortitude bestows (II-II, Q, cxxiii).
(4) Fortitude as one of the gifts from the Holy Ghost is a supernatural virtue, and passes beyond the Aristotelian range. It is what, as Christians, we must always have in mind in order to make our actions acceptable for eternal life. But we still keep hold upon the natural principles of fortitude as those whereon grace has to build. In the spiritual life of the ordinary Christian much that Aristotle has said remains in its own degree true, though we have to depart especially from the master's insistence upon the field of battle. Our exercise is mainly not in war strictly so-called, but in moral courage against the evil spirit of the times, against improper fashions, against human respect, against the common tendency to seek at least the comfortable, if not the voluptuous. We need courage also to be patient under poverty or privation, and to make laudable struggles to rise in the social scale. I requires fortitude to mount above the dead level of average Christianity into the region of magnanimity, and if opportunity allow it, of magnificence, which are the allied virtues of fortitude, while another is perseverance, which tolerates no occasional remissness, still less occasional bouts of dissipation to relieve the strain of high-toned morality and religion.
(5) The physical conditions of fortitude are treated for instance by Bain in "The Emotions and the Will", and they are such as these: "goodness of nervous tone which keeps all the currents in their proper courses with a certain robust persistence; health and freshness; tonic coolness; light and buoyant spirit; elate and sanguine temperament; acquired mastery over terror, as when the soldier gets over the cannon fever of his first engagement, and the public speaker over the nervousness of his first speech" (Chap V, no. 17). These physical matters, though not directly moral, are worthy of attention; there is much interaction between moral and physical qualities, and our duty is to cultivate the two departments of Fortitude conjointly.
Know Yourself
Maimonides on Life - Torah.org
Know Yourself
"There are many types of dispositions known to man, each different from the other, sometimes to an extreme. There is a person who possesses a temper, who is always angry, and there is one of even disposition (lit., "whose disposition is relaxed upon him") who never angers, and if he does, angers only slightly every couple of years. There is a person exceedingly haughty (lit., "of high heart"), and there is one of very lowly spirit. There is one of unbounded desires, whose soul is never sated with pursuing his passions. And there is one of extremely pure body, who does not even desire the little his body requires. There is one of covetous soul (lit., "of wide soul"), who will not be sated with all the wealth of the world, as the verse states, "One who loves money will never be sated with money" (Koheles 5:9). And there is one more limited, for whom it suffices even small insufficient amounts, and who will not even pursue all he requires. There is one who afflicts himself with hunger and gathers in everything, who will not eat so much as a penny's worth of his own except with the greatest of difficulty. And there is one who knowingly squanders all his available possessions. Along these lines are all other dispositions, such as lively vs. mournful, stingy vs. generous, cruel vs. compassionate, soft-hearted vs. courageous, and all the like."
First of all, welcome all! I gave a brief introduction to Maimonides (henceforth "the Rambam") and this work in my welcoming e-mail.
The Rambam begins by listing just a few of the possible personality types known to man. He is, of course, only introducing an idea at this point, yet I feel there are a few striking points already.
The famous dictum the Rambam will introduce this chapter is the importance of pursuing what is known as the Golden Mean -- the middle path in life, not veering too closely to either extreme. Don't be a hothead or an ice cube; don't be too hard and unfeeling or too soft and sensitive; don't be too high-strung or too easygoing. Extremism is dangerous in almost any context and form -- including, to be sure, extremism in tolerance. King Solomon tells us further that neither should we be too righteous (Koheles 7:16). There are times to be pious, but as with anything in life, there is religiousness to a fault. Religion, piety, asceticism can all be used as weapons of cruelty and intolerance, and as we all know too well, the most vicious and heinous of crimes can be committed (without shred of remorse) when justified under the banner of fighting G-d's holy war.
This, however, is a subject for later. For now I'd like to make a more basic observations. The Rambam begins his discussion here by observing that different personality types exist. And I feel this in itself is crucial. The Rambam did not jump in by stating how we *should* behave. He began by making that most critical first observation -- that people are different. Before a person can determine how he *should* be, he must first recognize whom he *now* is. What is my starting point? What are my challenges? Who am I and what must I overcome to reach my goals?
And this is, of course, not just a matter of knowing what challenges I must overcome. I must know who I am, and only then can I pursue my own ideal middle path. For the "middle" is not the same for any two individuals. The Talmud (Ta'anis 22a) records that Elijah the Prophet told a Torah scholar that a certain two individuals were destined for a special portion in the World to Come. When the scholar inquired from the two individuals what they did, they explained that (in addition to another merit) they were comedians, and if they would come across an unhappy person, they would humor him until he cheered up. Clearly, such people knew that their specialty was in good cheer and humor, and they used their special talent to make the world a brighter place.
Likewise, the Talmud (Shabbos 156a) writes that if a person has a predilection towards violence, he should become a surgeon, a shochet (one who ritually slaughters animals, making them kosher), or a mohel (one who performs circumcisions) -- for otherwise he'll find far less constructive outlets for his violent tendencies.
One other related source comes to mind. In Proverbs 22:6, King Solomon exhorts: "Instruct a lad according to his way; also when he is old he will not depart from it." The Vilna Gaon (R. Eliyahu Kramer, 18th Century leader of Lithuanian Jewry), in his commentary, explains that every child has his "way" -- his natural predilections. There could be no greater tragedy than attempting to raise every child in the same mold and image -- in vain attempt to mass produce children who all look and behave alike.
Continues the Vilna Gaon, some have a predilection towards violence. The Torah does not ask such people to go into accounting, crushing their natures to fit a socially-imposed mold. They should *use* their natures -- for surgery, meat preparation, or even more ideally to perform circumcisions. But their natures will come out one way or the other, if not in a person's youth when he is subject to his parents, as soon as he discovers who he really is.
Continues the Gaon, King David himself was of red complexion (I Samuel 16:12) -- signifying a taste for blood. This was so marked that Samuel the Prophet, when sent by G-d to David's parents to anoint the future king of Israel, summarily dismissed David -- as soon as he saw his ruddy face. Such could never be the face of G-d's anointed! (Many of us are old enough to remember: "Would you buy a used car from this man?" :-)
Nevertheless, David persevered. He took his violent nature and *used* it. He was not man of violence but fighter for G-d -- who fought G-d's holy wars, battling and defeating the enemies of Israel. When David is told by G-d, "You will not build a house to My name, for much blood have you spilled upon the ground before Me" (I Chronicles 22:8), the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni, Shmuel 145) comments that he feared he had become offensive to G-d on account of his battles. G-d responded: "I swear by your life that the people you have slain were as sacrifices before Me." To be sure, the Temple's construction must be completed by a different sort of person -- by David's son, the scholar-king Solomon, to whom the world over paid reverential homage. But the foundation of such world peace had to be built upon the destruction of those who would not accept G-d's sovereignty. And the slaying of sinners of the father may well have been more precious to G-d than the myriad sacrifices his son would one day offer.
This, concludes the Vilna Gaon, is the true intent of "Instruct a lad according to his way." We must see and recognize our children's natures (as well as our own), never ignoring them or attempting to reshape them into the form we imagine most popular or socially acceptable. For if we attempt to mold our child into a form not natural to him, he may listen when he is young and awed by us, but when he is old and free of our tyranny he'll depart from it -- for neither you nor he can change nature.
I remember reading years ago the observation that surveys performed on adolescents are notoriously unreliable -- for the simple reason that when asked to state their opinions, attitudes, interests, or values, (even anonymously), people at that age group are too busy looking over their shoulders: what is the most "in" answer, how would they like to remake themselves -- not what do they actually believe. (This seems to be particularly marked in image-conscious Americans.) And so tragically, we refuse to truly ask ourselves what our individual strengths and talents are until we're well beyond our most productive years.
Thus, the first great lesson of the Rambam. It all begins with knowing ourselves. We must understand our particular strengths and weaknesses. From that vantage point, certainly we are enjoined to ease ourselves towards the center. But our journey must begin with self-knowledge. For only when we know who we are today can we begin the journey towards true fulfillment.
Know Yourself
"There are many types of dispositions known to man, each different from the other, sometimes to an extreme. There is a person who possesses a temper, who is always angry, and there is one of even disposition (lit., "whose disposition is relaxed upon him") who never angers, and if he does, angers only slightly every couple of years. There is a person exceedingly haughty (lit., "of high heart"), and there is one of very lowly spirit. There is one of unbounded desires, whose soul is never sated with pursuing his passions. And there is one of extremely pure body, who does not even desire the little his body requires. There is one of covetous soul (lit., "of wide soul"), who will not be sated with all the wealth of the world, as the verse states, "One who loves money will never be sated with money" (Koheles 5:9). And there is one more limited, for whom it suffices even small insufficient amounts, and who will not even pursue all he requires. There is one who afflicts himself with hunger and gathers in everything, who will not eat so much as a penny's worth of his own except with the greatest of difficulty. And there is one who knowingly squanders all his available possessions. Along these lines are all other dispositions, such as lively vs. mournful, stingy vs. generous, cruel vs. compassionate, soft-hearted vs. courageous, and all the like."
First of all, welcome all! I gave a brief introduction to Maimonides (henceforth "the Rambam") and this work in my welcoming e-mail.
The Rambam begins by listing just a few of the possible personality types known to man. He is, of course, only introducing an idea at this point, yet I feel there are a few striking points already.
The famous dictum the Rambam will introduce this chapter is the importance of pursuing what is known as the Golden Mean -- the middle path in life, not veering too closely to either extreme. Don't be a hothead or an ice cube; don't be too hard and unfeeling or too soft and sensitive; don't be too high-strung or too easygoing. Extremism is dangerous in almost any context and form -- including, to be sure, extremism in tolerance. King Solomon tells us further that neither should we be too righteous (Koheles 7:16). There are times to be pious, but as with anything in life, there is religiousness to a fault. Religion, piety, asceticism can all be used as weapons of cruelty and intolerance, and as we all know too well, the most vicious and heinous of crimes can be committed (without shred of remorse) when justified under the banner of fighting G-d's holy war.
This, however, is a subject for later. For now I'd like to make a more basic observations. The Rambam begins his discussion here by observing that different personality types exist. And I feel this in itself is crucial. The Rambam did not jump in by stating how we *should* behave. He began by making that most critical first observation -- that people are different. Before a person can determine how he *should* be, he must first recognize whom he *now* is. What is my starting point? What are my challenges? Who am I and what must I overcome to reach my goals?
And this is, of course, not just a matter of knowing what challenges I must overcome. I must know who I am, and only then can I pursue my own ideal middle path. For the "middle" is not the same for any two individuals. The Talmud (Ta'anis 22a) records that Elijah the Prophet told a Torah scholar that a certain two individuals were destined for a special portion in the World to Come. When the scholar inquired from the two individuals what they did, they explained that (in addition to another merit) they were comedians, and if they would come across an unhappy person, they would humor him until he cheered up. Clearly, such people knew that their specialty was in good cheer and humor, and they used their special talent to make the world a brighter place.
Likewise, the Talmud (Shabbos 156a) writes that if a person has a predilection towards violence, he should become a surgeon, a shochet (one who ritually slaughters animals, making them kosher), or a mohel (one who performs circumcisions) -- for otherwise he'll find far less constructive outlets for his violent tendencies.
One other related source comes to mind. In Proverbs 22:6, King Solomon exhorts: "Instruct a lad according to his way; also when he is old he will not depart from it." The Vilna Gaon (R. Eliyahu Kramer, 18th Century leader of Lithuanian Jewry), in his commentary, explains that every child has his "way" -- his natural predilections. There could be no greater tragedy than attempting to raise every child in the same mold and image -- in vain attempt to mass produce children who all look and behave alike.
Continues the Vilna Gaon, some have a predilection towards violence. The Torah does not ask such people to go into accounting, crushing their natures to fit a socially-imposed mold. They should *use* their natures -- for surgery, meat preparation, or even more ideally to perform circumcisions. But their natures will come out one way or the other, if not in a person's youth when he is subject to his parents, as soon as he discovers who he really is.
Continues the Gaon, King David himself was of red complexion (I Samuel 16:12) -- signifying a taste for blood. This was so marked that Samuel the Prophet, when sent by G-d to David's parents to anoint the future king of Israel, summarily dismissed David -- as soon as he saw his ruddy face. Such could never be the face of G-d's anointed! (Many of us are old enough to remember: "Would you buy a used car from this man?" :-)
Nevertheless, David persevered. He took his violent nature and *used* it. He was not man of violence but fighter for G-d -- who fought G-d's holy wars, battling and defeating the enemies of Israel. When David is told by G-d, "You will not build a house to My name, for much blood have you spilled upon the ground before Me" (I Chronicles 22:8), the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni, Shmuel 145) comments that he feared he had become offensive to G-d on account of his battles. G-d responded: "I swear by your life that the people you have slain were as sacrifices before Me." To be sure, the Temple's construction must be completed by a different sort of person -- by David's son, the scholar-king Solomon, to whom the world over paid reverential homage. But the foundation of such world peace had to be built upon the destruction of those who would not accept G-d's sovereignty. And the slaying of sinners of the father may well have been more precious to G-d than the myriad sacrifices his son would one day offer.
This, concludes the Vilna Gaon, is the true intent of "Instruct a lad according to his way." We must see and recognize our children's natures (as well as our own), never ignoring them or attempting to reshape them into the form we imagine most popular or socially acceptable. For if we attempt to mold our child into a form not natural to him, he may listen when he is young and awed by us, but when he is old and free of our tyranny he'll depart from it -- for neither you nor he can change nature.
I remember reading years ago the observation that surveys performed on adolescents are notoriously unreliable -- for the simple reason that when asked to state their opinions, attitudes, interests, or values, (even anonymously), people at that age group are too busy looking over their shoulders: what is the most "in" answer, how would they like to remake themselves -- not what do they actually believe. (This seems to be particularly marked in image-conscious Americans.) And so tragically, we refuse to truly ask ourselves what our individual strengths and talents are until we're well beyond our most productive years.
Thus, the first great lesson of the Rambam. It all begins with knowing ourselves. We must understand our particular strengths and weaknesses. From that vantage point, certainly we are enjoined to ease ourselves towards the center. But our journey must begin with self-knowledge. For only when we know who we are today can we begin the journey towards true fulfillment.
Just
The Path of the Just
Chapter 12 (Part 1)
“The best way to actually acquire innocence” -- to really take to heart the trait we’ve spent so much time on till now, which touches on so many of our most fundamental human needs and spiritual aspirations -- Ramchal asserts, “is to constantly study the teachings of our sages in matters of halacha and mussar”.
That’s to say, we’d need to read and re-read these basic religious texts with the end in mind of digesting their wisdom and committing ourselves to their instruction. And we’d need both halacha and mussar because while halachic works lay out just what we’re to actually do to be free of all error, books of mussar (i.e., of traditional Jewish ethics and spiritual motivation) lay out the attitudes and traits we’d need to instill if we’re to follow the halacha wholeheartedly.
Do that sincerely, thoroughly, dedicatedly, and regularly, Ramchal avers, and “nothing will keep you back from (acquiring) innocence”.
The truth of the matter, though, is that you’d need to review halachic works again and again in order to refresh your memory. Since it’s easy enough to forget some of the more subtle things cited. And you’d also need to review mussar works since “even after a person will have established in his heart that he wants to be exacting when it comes to matters of innocence, it’s still possible that he can be guilty of a minor infraction simply because he never got to grasp it” on the sort of emotional, inspirational level that mussar books allow us to.
Ramchal makes the point in several of his other works, though, that we’re not to concentrate on halacha and mussa"
Chapter 12 (Part 1)
“The best way to actually acquire innocence” -- to really take to heart the trait we’ve spent so much time on till now, which touches on so many of our most fundamental human needs and spiritual aspirations -- Ramchal asserts, “is to constantly study the teachings of our sages in matters of halacha and mussar”.
That’s to say, we’d need to read and re-read these basic religious texts with the end in mind of digesting their wisdom and committing ourselves to their instruction. And we’d need both halacha and mussar because while halachic works lay out just what we’re to actually do to be free of all error, books of mussar (i.e., of traditional Jewish ethics and spiritual motivation) lay out the attitudes and traits we’d need to instill if we’re to follow the halacha wholeheartedly.
Do that sincerely, thoroughly, dedicatedly, and regularly, Ramchal avers, and “nothing will keep you back from (acquiring) innocence”.
The truth of the matter, though, is that you’d need to review halachic works again and again in order to refresh your memory. Since it’s easy enough to forget some of the more subtle things cited. And you’d also need to review mussar works since “even after a person will have established in his heart that he wants to be exacting when it comes to matters of innocence, it’s still possible that he can be guilty of a minor infraction simply because he never got to grasp it” on the sort of emotional, inspirational level that mussar books allow us to.
Ramchal makes the point in several of his other works, though, that we’re not to concentrate on halacha and mussa"
Do not steal
Do Not Steal, Part 12
In the previous article we discussed various forms of deceit and trickery that constitute stealing. What is the law when money or merchandise is given in error? Is the person ever permitted to keep the money without informing the company or individual of his mistake?
The Talmud tells us that deliberately neglecting to return money given in error is forbidden by three Torah commandments. One of them is the prohibition not to steal. The other two are commandments relating to the obligation to return lost objects - money or items given by mistake fall in the category of lost items that must be returned.[1]
There is much discussion about returning money given in mistake by non-Jews, which is beyond the scope of this column.[2] However, it is important to note that it is highly recommended to always adopt an approach that takes into the consideration that other people will carefully observe view a Jew's actions in monetary matters. By being scrupulously honest, a Jew brings about a kiddush Hashem, (a sanctification of G-d's name) whereby people see the virtuous conduct of the Jewish people. Conversely, being deceitful brings about a chillul Hashem (a desecration of G-d's name).
Rav Pinchos Bodner shlita tells over the following story that demonstrates the importance of being honest, and the way we are viewed by the people around us.
Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky zt"l[3] recounted that when he was a Rabbi in Lithuania before World War 2, he was asked a question by a resident of his community. The man had purchased stamps from the local post office, and had received more stamps that he had paid for. For such a poor man, the extra stamps were no trifle matter. Nonetheless, Rav Kaminetsky suspected that perhaps the postal clerk was testing the rabbi. This suspicion was confirmed a short time later when the clerk gave him too much change. The rabbi returned the extra money. Many years after the Nazis came and destroyed the community, the rabbi heard that this clerk had saved many Jews, testifying that he tested everybody to assess their honesty, the only trustworthy people were the Jews!
This teaches us that in addition to the obligation to be honest and avoid thievery, a Jew must be extra vigilant to bring about a kiddush Hashem.
[1] See gemara, Bava Metsia, 26b.[2] See Rav Pinchos Bodner, 'Halachos of Other People's Money, p.5-51 for more on this issue.[3] He was one of the leading Rabbanim in the world in the second half of the 20th century.
In the previous article we discussed various forms of deceit and trickery that constitute stealing. What is the law when money or merchandise is given in error? Is the person ever permitted to keep the money without informing the company or individual of his mistake?
The Talmud tells us that deliberately neglecting to return money given in error is forbidden by three Torah commandments. One of them is the prohibition not to steal. The other two are commandments relating to the obligation to return lost objects - money or items given by mistake fall in the category of lost items that must be returned.[1]
There is much discussion about returning money given in mistake by non-Jews, which is beyond the scope of this column.[2] However, it is important to note that it is highly recommended to always adopt an approach that takes into the consideration that other people will carefully observe view a Jew's actions in monetary matters. By being scrupulously honest, a Jew brings about a kiddush Hashem, (a sanctification of G-d's name) whereby people see the virtuous conduct of the Jewish people. Conversely, being deceitful brings about a chillul Hashem (a desecration of G-d's name).
Rav Pinchos Bodner shlita tells over the following story that demonstrates the importance of being honest, and the way we are viewed by the people around us.
Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky zt"l[3] recounted that when he was a Rabbi in Lithuania before World War 2, he was asked a question by a resident of his community. The man had purchased stamps from the local post office, and had received more stamps that he had paid for. For such a poor man, the extra stamps were no trifle matter. Nonetheless, Rav Kaminetsky suspected that perhaps the postal clerk was testing the rabbi. This suspicion was confirmed a short time later when the clerk gave him too much change. The rabbi returned the extra money. Many years after the Nazis came and destroyed the community, the rabbi heard that this clerk had saved many Jews, testifying that he tested everybody to assess their honesty, the only trustworthy people were the Jews!
This teaches us that in addition to the obligation to be honest and avoid thievery, a Jew must be extra vigilant to bring about a kiddush Hashem.
[1] See gemara, Bava Metsia, 26b.[2] See Rav Pinchos Bodner, 'Halachos of Other People's Money, p.5-51 for more on this issue.[3] He was one of the leading Rabbanim in the world in the second half of the 20th century.
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